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The Power of Two Words to Split 
Circuits 
NATALIE WHITACRE* 
28 U.S.C. § 1782 authorizes federal judges to grant as-
sistance to a “foreign or international tribunal” for discov-
ery proceedings. The meaning of the term “foreign or in-
ternational tribunal” has been the subject of much dispute. 
In 2019 the Sixth Circuit became the first court of appeals 
to extend the purview of the statute to private commercial 
arbitration, creating a circuit split. However, the use of 28 
U.S.C. § 1782 in arbitral proceedings raises a number of 
questions about whether U.S. style discovery would impede 
the efficiency of arbitration and whether the practice could 
be extended to international tribunals located within the 
United States. This Note explores the contours of the statute 
and the implications of the Sixth Circuit’s decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every 
fact, every opinion.”1 Writing for a unanimous Sixth Circuit, Judge 
John K. Bush opened his opinion for Abdul Lateef Jamil Transpor-
tation Co. v. FedEx Corp. (“FedEx”) with this excerpt from a letter 
written by Thomas Jefferson to his nephew.2 Jefferson’s words 
personify reason and offer imagery of her tribunal as a truth-
seeking decisionmaker.3 This literary epigraph quoted in the FedEx 
opinion foreshadowed the court’s expansive application of 28 
U.S.C. § 1782 (“§ 1782”).4 It stood as an erudite gateway to an 
opinion that dramatically departed from the decisions of two other 
Courts of Appeals,5 creating a circuit split based on the meaning of 
two words: arbitral tribunal.6 
 
 1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 15 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955), quoted in In 
re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings (Abdul Latif 
Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 2 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 713. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. at 713–14. 
 5 See id. at 726. 
 6 See id. at 724; In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal S.A., No. 14-mc-80277-
JST (DMR), 2015 WL 1815251, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015). In Grupo 
Unidos, the court poignantly expressed the issue that continues to divide courts: 
“Two words from a law review article quoted by the Supreme Court . . . have 
spawned disharmony in the courts regarding whether [§ 1782] applies to private 
arbitrations established by contract.” Id. The “two words” referred to by the 
court were “arbitral tribunals.” Id. (discussing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004)). 
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The statute at issue in FedEx was § 1782,7 which authorizes 
federal judges to grant assistance in discovery to foreign and inter-
national tribunals.8 In relevant part, the statute reads, 
The district court of the district in which a person 
resides or is found may order him to give his testi-
mony or statement or to produce a document or oth-
er thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or in-
ternational tribunal . . . . The order may be 
made . . . by a foreign or international tribunal or 
upon the application of any interested person and 
may direct that the testimony or statement be given, 
or the document or other thing be produced, before 
a person appointed by the court.9 
This statute, which represents a powerful discovery tool in foreign 
and international litigation, has been the subject of much dispute.10 
One of the most contentious issues is the interpretation of the 
phrase “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” leading 
to speculation about whether such judicial assistance is available in 
private commercial arbitration.11 
The Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in FedEx signified the first 
time that a Court of Appeals held that private arbitral tribunals are 
“foreign or international tribunals” within the meaning § 1782 and, 
therefore, may qualify for judicial assistance.12 The FedEx decision 
split from prior opinions issued by the Fifth and Second Circuits 
 
 7 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 713. 
 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 
 9 Id. (emphasis added). 
 10 See LUCAS V.M. BENTO, THE GLOBALIZATION OF DISCOVERY 46–47 
(2020) (“These couple hundred words [that constitute § 1782] have been the 
source of over 1,000 reported federal district court decisions, over 150 federal 
appellate decisions, and one major U.S. Supreme Court decision.”). 
 11 See id. at 108–10. 
 12 See Gilbert A. Samberg & Todd Rosenbaum, Calling SCOTUS: Sixth 
Circuit Re-Establishes Circuit Split Re U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign Com-
mercial Arbitration (28 U.S.C. § 1782), NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/calling-scotus-sixth-circuit-re-
establishes-circuit-split-re-us-discovery-aid. 
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which reached the opposite conclusion.13 Since the split, the topic 
has been hotly debated, requiring other courts to weigh in on the 
issue.14 But crucial questions remain: Was FedEx correctly decid-
ed? How far should the scope of § 1782 extend? What impact will 
the decision have on private arbitral proceedings? This Note en-
deavors to comprehensively address each of these questions. 
This Note has three principal parts. The first Part of this Note 
will describe the origin of § 1782 and Congress’ expansion of the 
statute’s scope in light of globalization. It will also discuss how 
appellate courts have interpreted the phrase “foreign or interna-
tional tribunal” narrowly and why the Supreme Court conversely 
suggested that the language was meant to encompass a broad range 
of dispute resolution procedures. The second Part offers a detailed 
account of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in FedEx and explains 
how the court reached its conclusion that private arbitral tribunals 
fall within the ambit of § 1782. Lastly, the third Part explores the 
conclusions reached by other circuit courts since the circuit split 
and discusses whether the FedEx decision would be confirmed by 
the Supreme Court. It also examines questions that remain unan-
swered about the impact of § 1782 on private arbitration. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF § 1782 
A. The Evolution of 1782 
International judicial assistance has existed in the United States 
since the founding of the country.15 The first recognized means for 
foreign litigants to obtain evidence in the United States was 
through letters rogatory and commissions: In general, a foreign 
court could make a request to a U.S. court for assistance in the dis-
 
 13 Id.; In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 726 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
 14 See John B. Pinney, Update: The Section 1782 Conflict Intensifies as the 
International Arbitration Issue Goes to the Supreme Court, 38 ALTS. HIGH COST 
LITIG. 125, 125 (2020). 
 15 See Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and 
International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 597, 600 (1990); Michael Campi-
on Miller et al., 28 U.S.C. § 1782 and the Evolution of International Judicial 
Assistance in United States Courts, FED. LAW., May 2012, at 44, 44. 
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covery process and, if accepted, the U.S. court would appoint a 
commissioner to gather the evidence sought.16 The purpose of the 
process was to “aid[ ] in the administration of justice.”17 The dis-
covery tool, however, was rarely used due to challenges in execut-
ing letters rogatory at that time and because federal courts were 
resistant to providing assistance to foreign courts.18 
In the aftermath of the second world war, the United States 
made a concerted effort to facilitate and strengthen relationships 
among nations.19 Growing incentives for cross-border cooperation 
inspired Congress to revitalize prior legislation regarding judicial 
assistance by passing 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in 1948.20 Just a year later, 
the statute was amended for broader application in 1949.21 The 
revived and modernized statute authorized the district court where 
a “witness resides or may be found” to compel “[t]he deposition of 
any witness within the United States to be used in any judicial pro-
ceeding pending in any court in a foreign country with which the 
United States is at peace.”22 
 
 16 Stahr, supra note 15, at 600 nn.12–13; see also EDWARD P. WEEKS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEPOSITIONS § 128 at 151 (1880) (“There is a broad 
distinction between the execution of a commission and the procurement of tes-
timony by the instrumentality of letters rogatory or requisitory. In the former 
case, the rules of procedure are established by the court issuing the commission, 
and are entirely under its control. In the latter, the methods of procedure must, 
from the nature of the case, be altogether under the control of the foreign tribu-
nal which is appealed to for assistance in the administration of justice.”). 
 17 Stahr, supra note 15, at 600–01. 
 18 See Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44. For a more complete history of 
international judicial assistance between 1780 and 1948, see Stahr, supra note 
15, at 600–04. 
 19 Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44–45; see, e.g., History of the United Na-
tions, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/history-
united-nations (last visited May 15, 2021) (explaining that after World War II 
there existed a strong sentiment that international cooperation would lead to 
lasting peace between countries and that this was motivation behind establishing 
the United Nations). 
 20 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247–48 
(2004); Stahr, supra note 15, at 602–03; Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44–45; 
Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1782, 62 Stat. 869, 949. 
 21 See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 248; Miller et al., supra note 15, at 44; Act of 
May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 93, 63 Stat. 89, 103. 
 22 See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1782, 62 Stat. 869, 949; 
Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 93, 63 Stat. 89, 103. 
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Over the next decade, however, international trade expanded 
rapidly, and Congress determined that the statute required consid-
erable revision to meet the needs of increased commercial dis-
putes.23 In 1964, § 1782 was expanded in four major respects: (1) 
assistance was available for the retrieval of documents and other 
evidence, not just for the taking of depositions; (2) the word 
“court” was replaced with “foreign or international tribunal”; (3) 
discovery could be sought by “any interested person”; and (4) there 
was no longer a requirement that litigation be pending, but the evi-
dence sought must eventually be used in a proceeding.24 The goal 
was to aid in foreign and international proceedings and to encour-
age other countries to reciprocate such assistance.25 
These additions to the traditional notion of judicial assistance 
left much to interpretation by the courts, particularly the phrase 
“foreign or international tribunal”—a term that was left undefined 
by the drafters of the statute.26 Since the rise of private internation-
al arbitration over the last thirty years, one of the most hotly debat-
ed issues with regards to § 1782 discovery has been whether pri-
vate commercial arbitration falls within the definition of “foreign 
or international tribunal.”27 
 
 23 See Nicolò Trocker, U.S.-Style Discovery for Non-U.S. Proceedings: 
Judicial Assistance or Judicial Interference?, 1 INT’L J. PROC. L. 299, 307 
(2011). See generally Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance: 
Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J., 515, 516–18 
(1953) (discussing the ways in which judicial assistance fell short in 1953 and 
addressing the need for legislative improvements). 
 24 Trocker, supra note 23, at 307–08; Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
619, § 9, 78 Stat. 995, 997 (§ 1782 as enacted by Congress). 
 25 Trocker, supra note 23, at 308. These goals are often referred to as the 
“twin-aims” of the statute. Id.; see also Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 252 (citing Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 669 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 26 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 
1999) (explaining that “foreign or international tribunal” was left undefined in 
§ 1782); Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263 n.15 (“In light of the variety of foreign 
proceedings resistant to ready classification in domestic terms, Congress left 
unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter is proceeding 
‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”); Trocker, supra note 23, at 309. 
 27 See BENTO, supra note 10, at 106–08 (explaining that the issue of defin-
ing “foreign or international tribunal” has been most contentious in the context 
of private arbitrations). See generally id. at 106–28 (illustrating a comprehensive 
history of how courts have construed “foreign or international tribunal” in con-
text of private arbitration). 
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B. Circuit Courts Exclude Arbitral Tribunals from § 1782 
Discovery 
In 1999, the Second Circuit became the first court of appeals to 
address the issue of whether a private arbitration qualifies for 
§ 1782 aid in National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. 
(“National Broadcasting”).28 The case concerned a commercial 
arbitration proceeding between National Broadcasting Company 
(“NBC”) and Azteca, a Mexican broadcasting company, adminis-
tered by the International Chamber of Commerce in Mexico.29 In 
anticipation of arbitration, NBC submitted a § 1782 discovery re-
quest in the Southern District of New York to serve third-party 
financial institutions with document subpoenas.30 The request was 
initially granted but later quashed because the district court found 
that “the term ‘foreign or international tribunal’ in 
[§ 1782] . . . does not encompass private international commercial 
arbitration.”31 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this ruling.32 In its 
analysis, the court explained that the word “tribunal” was ambigu-
ous and, therefore, private arbitral panels could not necessarily be 
included or excluded.33 It then examined the legislative history of 
the statute to discern the meaning of “tribunal” and determined that 
“the word ‘tribunal’ is used to make it clear that assistance is not 
confined to proceedings before conventional courts . . . .”34 Never-
theless, the court concluded that “tribunal” was reserved for “gov-
ernmental entities . . . acting as state instrumentalities or with the 
authority of the state.”35 
 
 28 See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 185; see also Anna Conley, A New 
World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent Federal Courts’ Deci-
sions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§1782, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 45, 50 (2006) (explaining that Second Circuit 
was first court of appeals to consider this matter). 
 29 Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 186. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 191. 
 33 Id. at 188. 
 34 Id. at 188–89 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88–1052, at 9 (1963); S. REP. NO. 
88–1580, at 7 (1964)). 
 35 Id. at 189. 
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In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on House and Sen-
ate Reports, which mention “state instrumentalities,” such as for-
eign administrative tribunals, quasi-judicial agencies, and investi-
gative magistrates.36 These supplementary materials, however, 
failed to mention private dispute resolution proceedings and, there-
fore, the court found that “[t]he absence of any reference to private 
dispute resolution proceedings such as arbitration strongly suggests 
that Congress did not consider them in drafting the statute.”37 
Moreover, the court noted that prior legislation used the term 
“international tribunal” to refer to intergovernmental tribunals pur-
suant to a treaty.38 The court reasoned that although the 1964 revi-
sions were meant to broaden the scope of the statute, the inclusion 
of private arbitration would have been an extreme deviation from 
the original intent of the statute and would have warranted 
acknowledgement.39 The court found that “[t]he legislative histo-
ry’s silence with respect to private tribunals” proves that extending 
§ 1782 to private arbitration was not the intent of Congress.40 
The Second Circuit also reasoned that this type of discovery 
would conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), the 
body of law in the United States that controls judicial treatment of 
arbitration agreements.41 It explained that § 1782 would provide 
for broader discovery in private arbitration than that permitted un-
der § 7 of the FAA.42 For example, § 7 of the FAA permits only 
arbitrators to seek judicial assistance and the evidence is limited to 
testimony and material physical evidence.43 By contrast, § 1782 
allows “any interested party” to apply for judicial assistance, and 
the district court has the power to compel a person to give testimo-
ny, give a statement, or to produce “a document or other thing for 
use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”44 The 
court determined that allowing such broad evidence-gathering 
mechanisms as provided for by § 1782 would overburden the al-
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 189–90. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 190. 
 41 Id. at 187–88. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 7. 
 44 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 
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ternative dispute resolution process—a mechanism that is valued 
for its time and cost efficiency.45 
That same year, the Fifth Circuit in Republic of Kazakhstan v. 
Biedermann International (“Biedermann”) also found that “§ 1782 
does not apply to private international arbitrations.”46 The court 
closely followed the reasoning of the Second Circuit but made a 
note that international commercial arbitration would have been 
considered a novel concept in 1964 and, therefore, would not have 
been contemplated by the drafters.47 
C.  The Supreme Court Unlocks the Door to a Broader 
Interpretation of § 1782 
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“Intel”) marked 
the first time in history that a § 1782 decision was reviewed by the 
Supreme Court.48 In that case, Advanced Micro Devices filed an 
antitrust complaint against Intel Corporation with the Directorate-
General for Competition of the European Commission (“European 
Commission”) and petitioned the Northern District of California 
for the production of documents under § 1782.49 One of the issues 
before the Court was whether a proceeding before the European 
Commission constituted a “foreign or international tribunal” under 
§ 1782.50 While the question of whether § 1782 is available to pri-
vate arbitrations was not before the Supreme Court, Justice Gins-
 
 45 See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 190–91 (“The popularity of arbitration 
rests in considerable part on its asserted efficiency and cost-effectiveness . . . .”). 
 46 Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
 47 Id. at 882; Conley, supra note 28, at 52. 
 48 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 246 (2004); 
Daniel A. Losk, Section 1782(a) After Intel: Reconciling Policy Considerations 
and a Proposed Framework to Extend Judicial Assistance to International Arbi-
tral Tribunals, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1035, 1046 (2005) (“Ruling on § 1782(a) 
for the first time in the statute’s 150 years of existence, the Supreme Court in 
Intel delivered a broad, liberal interpretation of the availability of judicial assis-
tance.”). 
 49 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 246. 
 50 See id. at 246–47; see also European Commission, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-
commission_en (last visited May 15, 2021) (explaining that the European 
Commission is the executive branch of the European Union). 
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berg, writing for the majority, constructed an expansive interpreta-
tion of “tribunal.”51 
In its analysis the Court noted that the 1964 version of the stat-
ute deliberately replaced “any judicial proceeding” with “a pro-
ceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”52 The Court rea-
soned that the change permitted aid to administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings—in other words, the 1964 version expressly 
provided for non-judicial proceedings.53 Additionally, the Court 
chose to read the language of the statute liberally, stating that 
“Congress left unbounded by categorical rules the determination 
whether a matter is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international tribu-
nal.’”54 
Most significantly, the Court cited with approval an article 
written by Hans Smit, one of the chief architects of the 1964 revi-
sions, which states, “[t]he term ‘tribunal’. . . includes investigating 
magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals . . . .”55 Another 
portion of Professor Smit’s article briefly noted by the Court ex-
plains, “[t]he increasing number and importance of international 
tribunals make this liberal provision of assistance in aid of litiga-
tion in international tribunals of great significance. . . . The new 
legislation [] authorizes assistance in aid of international arbitral 
tribunals.”56 
Intel was significant for judicial assistance. The Court conclud-
ed that the European Commission was a “tribunal” within the am-
bit of § 1782 on the basis that it operated as a “first-instance deci-
sionmaker” that was subject to judicial review.57 It also established 
a four-factor test intended to guide judges when deciding whether 
 
 51 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 257–58, 263 n.15. 
 52 Id. at 258. 
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. at 263 n.15. 
 55 Id. at 258 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citing Hans Smit, 
International Litigation under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 
1026 n.71, 1027 n.73 (1965)); Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones 
S.A. v. JAS Forwarding (USA), Inc., 685 F.3d 987, 994 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(explaining that Professor Smit was “dominant drafter” of 1964 revisions to 
§ 1782). 
 56 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258; Smit, supra note 55, at 1027 n.73 (emphasis 
added). 
 57 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258. 
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to grant § 1782 discovery aid to a party.58 But most notably, the 
opinion disrupted the trend toward excluding commercial arbitra-
tion from § 1782, causing many to speculate whether National 
Broadcasting and Biedermann were correctly decided.59 
It was two words—“arbitral tribunals”—quoted by the Su-
preme Court from Professor Smit’s article that “spawned dishar-
mony in the courts regarding whether [§ 1782] applies to private 
arbitrations established by contract.”60 After Intel, a flurry of dis-
trict court opinions were published addressing the definition of 
“foreign or international tribunal” under § 1782, and across district 
courts no consensus was reached on the matter.61  
The first court of appeals to address the issue following Intel 
was the Eleventh Circuit.62 Relying on Intel, the court concluded 
that a commercial arbitration was a “tribunal” for the purposes of 
§ 1782 discovery because the arbitral panel was a “first-instance 
decisionmaker” that was subject to judicial review.63 The court, 
however, mysteriously revised its opinion two years later and sua 
sponte withdrew its judgement on whether an arbitral tribunal con-
stitutes a § 1782 tribunal.64 This application of Intel remained un-
 
 58 See Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–65. 
 59 See, e.g., Losk, supra note 48, at 1048–50. 
 60 In re Grupo Unidos Por El Canal S.A., No. 14-mc-80277-JST (DMR), 
2015 WL 1815251, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015). 
 61 See, e.g., In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 
2006) (“The Court holds that the [arbitral panel] is a ‘foreign or international 
tribunal’ within the meaning of § 1782(a).”); In re Oxus Gold PLC, MISC No. 
06-822007-GEB, WL 1037387, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007); In re Grupo Unidos 
Por El Canal, S.A., No. 14-mc-00226-MSK-KMT, 2015 WL 1810135, at *8 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 17, 2015); Helen Trading S.A. v. McQuilling Partners Inc., No. 4:18-
MC-154, 2018 WL 7252925, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2018); see also In re 
Storag Etzel GmbH, No. 19-mc-209-CFC, 2020 WL 1849714, at *1 n.1 (D. Del. 
Apr. 13, 2020) (listing all cases to date that have addressed the issue of whether 
“tribunal” in § 1782 includes arbitral bodies). 
 62 Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A. v. JAS Forwarding 
(USA), Inc., 685 F.3d 987, 989–90 (11th Cir. 2012), superseded by 747 F.3d 
1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 63 See id. at 994–97. 
 64 See Consorcio, 747 F.3d at 1265, 1270 n.4. 
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explored by appellate courts until 2019 when the issue came before 
the Sixth Circuit.65 
II.  ABDUL LATIF JAMEEL TRANSPORTATION CO. V. FEDEX CORP. 
Fifteen years after Intel, the Sixth Circuit concluded that pri-
vate arbitration is a “foreign or international tribunal” within the 
purview of § 1782 in FedEx.66 The principal issue before the court 
was whether a commercial arbitration taking place in a foreign 
country between a Saudi corporation and a U.S. corporation could 
gain access to § 1782 assistance.67 Judge Bush, writing a unani-
mous decision, found inspiration in the words of Thomas Jeffer-
son: “Thomas Jefferson once counseled his nephew Peter Carr on 
how to think: ‘Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal 
every fact, every opinion.’ This case calls upon us to do just 
that.”68 
A. Background: Facts and Procedural History 
In 2014, FedEx International, a division of FedEx Corporation 
(“FedEx Corp.”), entered into a General Service Provider (“GSP”) 
contract with Abdul Latif Jameel Transportation (“ALJ”), a Saudi 
company.69 The GSP provided that ALJ would provide delivery 
services for FedEx International within Saudi Arabia.70 The con-
tract contained an arbitration clause that required all disputes aris-
ing from the GSP to be settled through arbitration in Dubai under 
the rules of the Dubai International Financial Centre-London Court 
of International Arbitration (the “DIFC-LCIA”).71 
The relationship between the parties began to sour with both 
parties claiming breach of contract, and by 2018, all attempts at 
 
 65 See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 714 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 713. 
 68 Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), 
in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14, 15 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). 
 69 Id. at 714; Corrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee FedEx Corp. at 4, 
FedEx, 939 F.3d 710 (2019) (No. 19-5315) [hereinafter FedEx Brief]. 
 70 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 714. 
 71 Id. 
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reconciliation had been completely frustrated.72 As a result, FedEx 
International initiated the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration, in accordance 
with the GSP.73 On May 14, 2018, ALJ applied to the Western 
District of Tennessee for an ex parte order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1782, to obtain discovery from FedEx Corp. for use in the arbi-
tration proceedings located in Dubai.74 The district court denied 
ALJ’s application, concluding that the phrase “foreign or interna-
tional tribunal” in § 1782 did not include private arbitral proceed-
ings, such as DIFC-LCIA; therefore, ALJ was not eligible for as-
sistance under § 1782 for those proceedings.75 On April 12, 2019, 
ALJ appealed to the Sixth Circuit.76 
B. Relying on the Language of the Statute, the Sixth Circuit 
Found that “Tribunal” Encompasses Private Arbitration 
In determining “whether the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration panel 
qualified as a § 1782(a) ‘foreign or international tribunal,’” 77 the 
court relied heavily on an analysis of the language of the statute. In 
searching for the definition of “tribunal,” the court examined the 
plain meaning of the word, the historical legal uses of the word, 
and finally, the statutory definition of “tribunal.”78 The answers 
found in this textual exploration determined the outcome of the 
case: According to the Sixth Circuit, the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration 
panel qualified as a “foreign or international tribunal” within the 
purview of § 1782.79 
 
 72 See id. at 714–15. 
 73 Id. at 715. 
 74 Id. at 715–16. In addition to the GSP, FedEx International and ALJ had 
entered into a Domestic Service Agreement (“DSA”) that contained an arbitra-
tion clause requiring the parties to settle any dispute in Saudi Arabia under Sau-
di law. Id. at 714. Before FedEx International commenced the DIFC-LCIA Arbi-
tration, ALJ had submitted to a dispute in connection with the DSA to a Saudi 
arbitration panel. Id. at 715. ALJ sought § 1782 assistance for discovery in both 
the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration and the Saudi arbitration; however, the Saudi arbi-
tration was dismissed, so the Sixth Circuit declined to decide the issue with re-
spect to that arbitration. Id. at 716–17. 
 75 Id. at 716. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 717. 
 78 See id. at 717–18. 
 79 Id. at 723. 
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Because the drafters of the statute left the term “foreign or in-
ternational tribunal” undefined, the court began its analysis with an 
examination of the plain meaning of “tribunal.”80 It noted that 
there was no evidence to indicate that either “international tribu-
nal” or “foreign tribunal” was a term of art with a specialized 
meaning.81 As a result, the court decided to focus exclusively on 
the definition of “tribunal.”82 
To start, the court considered it important to examine the use of 
the word at the time the statute was drafted,83 and looked to both 
legal and non-legal dictionary definitions of “tribunal” to discern 
its meaning.84 It found that legal dictionaries from the time did not 
consistently define the scope of the word “tribunal”: In some cases, 
the definition was broad enough to include private arbitration, and 
in other cases, it was not.85 The court could not rely on these in-
consistent definitions.86 
Instead, the court turned its attention to the use of the word 
“tribunal” in legal writing.87 It observed that “American jurists and 
lawyers have long used the word ‘tribunal’ in . . . a sense that in-
cludes private, contracted-for, commercial arbitral panels,”88 citing 
several examples of this use of the word as far back as the 1850s.89 
It noted that even private arbitrations at issue before the Supreme 
Court have been referred to as “tribunals,” both before and after 
the drafting of § 1782.90 
 
 80 Id. at 717. 
 81 Id. at 718–19. 
 82 Id. at 719 (“[T]here is no dispute that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration is ‘for-
eign or international’ in nature. Thus, we focus on the meaning of ‘tribunal,’ 
which is hotly disputed.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 83 Id. at 717. 
 84 Id. at 719–720. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. at 720. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. at 720–21 (“Justice Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Equity Ju-
risprudence used the word “tribunal” to describe private, contracted-for arbitra-
tions . . . .” (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 1457 at 955 (6th ed. 1853))). 
 90 See id. at 721–22 (first citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 
Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); then citing Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 
348 U.S. 176, 185 (1955) (Black, J., dissenting); then citing Red Cross Line v. 
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Finally, because an inquiry into the context in which the word 
is used within legislation is an essential facet of statutory interpre-
tation, the court looked to the congressional meaning of the word.91 
It found that “evidence of congressional usage does not compel a 
narrower understanding of [“tribunal”] than its linguistic mean-
ing.”92 For example, § 1782 reads, “[t]he [§ 1782 discovery] order 
may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole 
or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the in-
ternational tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or pro-
ducing the document or other thing.”93 FedEx Corp. took the posi-
tion that the term “foreign or international tribunal” applies exclu-
sively to governmental entities because only governmental entities 
will have established procedures for the taking of evidence.94 The 
Sixth Circuit quickly dismissed this assertion, explaining that the 
inclusion of the phrase “may be in whole or in part” is permis-
sive—there is no requirement that such procedures be applied or 
that it be shown that they even exist, but if the adjudicatory body 
uses particular procedures in the collection of evidence, “then the 
district court may order that evidence be collected pursuant to 
those procedures.”95 The court explained that no other uses of the 
word “tribunal” within the statute indicate a more limited defini-
tion of the word.96 
The court relied heavily on the statutory language, explaining 
that its “analysis begins with the language of the statute[,] [a]nd 
where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there 
as well.”97 The court concluded: “[T]he text, context, and structure 
of [§ 1782] provide no reason to doubt that the word ‘tribunal’ in-
 
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 n.1 (1924); and then citing Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985)). 
 91 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 722 (“[I]f the overall context and structure of the 
statute indicate that Congress used the word in a different sense than its linguis-
tic meaning, the congressional meaning controls.”). 
 92 Id. 
 93 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a); FedEx, 939 F.3d at 722. 
 94 Id. at 722–23. 
 95 Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. (describing only one other appearance of the word “tribunal” and ex-
plaining that its use was “not inconsistent with a definition of the word that in-
cludes private arbitrations”). 
 97 Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999)). 
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cludes private commercial arbitral panels . . . . Therefore, we need 
look no further to hold that the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration panel is a 
‘foreign or international tribunal.’”98 With that, the Sixth Circuit 
reversed the decision of the lower court.99 
C. The Sixth Circuit Addressed Remaining Arguments 
Although the Sixth Circuit arrived at its decision at the end of 
its analysis of statutory language, it nevertheless went on to identi-
fy and examine all remaining arguments that could implant doubt 
in the court’s findings. It addressed its disagreement with the statu-
tory interpretation in Biedermann and National Broadcasting.100 It 
also bolstered its own conclusion with the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Intel.101 Lastly, the court dispensed with all public policy 
concerns that had been raised.102 The Sixth Circuit’s thorough in-
vestigation into all contrary arguments helped to reinforce its final 
conclusion and justify its split from the other Courts of Appeals. 
1. “FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL” IS NOT LIMITED 
TO GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
The Second and Fifth Circuit court decisions relied heavily on 
legislative history in finding that under § 1782 a “foreign or inter-
national tribunal” could not be a private arbitral proceeding.103 Ac-
cording to these courts, the legislative history indicated that the 
statute was intended to apply exclusively to government entities.104 
The FedEx court found these conclusions to be unpersuasive.105 
First, the FedEx court found that legislative history is not con-
trolling in statutory interpretations.106 It explained that the reliabil-
ity of legislative history has been questioned because it consists of 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 723, 732. 
 100 Id. at 726. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 728. 
 103 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188–90 (2d 
Cir. 1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881–82 
(5th Cir. 1999). 
 104 See Nat’l Broad. Co., 165 F.3d at 188–90; Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 881–
82. 
 105 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 726–28. 
 106 See id. at 726. 
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rough drafts and preliminary writings that may not reflect the ulti-
mate intentions of the majority.107 Second, in this case, neither the 
legislative history nor the text of § 1782 contain limiting language 
and, therefore, if the court were to rely on such sources it would 
still reach the same conclusion.108 The court emphasized that both 
legislative history and the statutory language provide evidence of 
Congress’ intent to expand the reach of § 1782, and “the legislative 
history does not indicate that the expansion stopped short of pri-
vate arbitration.”109 
The Sixth Circuit also dispensed with the notion that, under In-
tel, a § 1782 “tribunal” must be limited to a judicial or state-
sponsored entity.110 It rejected the idea that the second Intel factor 
(“a court . . . may consider the nature of the foreign tribunal, the 
character of proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of 
the foreign government, court, or agency to federal-court judicial 
assistance”111) intended to limit or define tribunal.112 In support, 
the court quoted Justice Ginsburg’s explanation that Congress “left 
unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter 
is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international tribunal.’”113 All in all, 
the Sixth Circuit made a strong assertion that § 1782 was intended 
to be construed broadly and, therefore, private arbitration is under 
the umbrella of “foreign or international tribunals.” 
2. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DID NOT IMPACT THE SIXTH 
CIRCUIT’S CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit turned to policy considerations last, explain-
ing that policy arguments carry very little weight in its decision 
 
 107 See id. at 727. 
 108 See id. at 727–28. 
 109 Id. (“The facts on which the legislative history is most clear are that the 
substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judicial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the 
statute, and . . . removed the requirement that the United States be a party to an 
international agreement under which a proceeding takes place.”). 
 110 See id. at 723–26. 
 111 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 244 (2004). 
 112 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 725–26 (“Indeed, that the Court made ‘the nature of 
the foreign tribunal’ a factor for the district court to consider suggests that the 
Court was not attempting to contemplate any and all possible types of ‘tribunal’ 
in which § 1782(a) discovery might be granted.”). 
 113 Id. at 726 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263 n.15). 
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because “achieving a better policy outcome . . . is a task for Con-
gress, not the courts.”114 The court, however, went on to address 
these concerns because even if it “were inclined to countenance 
policy arguments,” such arguments do not mandate that the court 
reach a different conclusion.115 
One policy argument asserted by FedEx Corp. was that § 1782 
unfairly grants broader discovery than what is typically available 
in domestic arbitration disputes.116 Chapter 1 § 7 of the FAA, 
which governs domestic arbitration in the United States, empowers 
only arbitrators to request judicial assistance in the discovery pro-
cess.117 By contrast, § 1782 provides that “any interested person,” 
including parties and even third parties, may petition federal courts 
for evidentiary aid.118 Thus, foreign parties engaged in arbitration 
would have access to a discovery tool that is not available to par-
ties in domestic arbitration.119 
The Sixth Circuit was unpersuaded by this argument.120 It 
pointed out that the Intel court dispensed with such concerns due to 
the fact that under § 1782, there is no requirement that a foreign 
party provide equivalent information or grant U.S. citizens similar 
access to judicial assistance.121 Indeed, “Section 1782 . . . does not 
direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to 
 
 114 Id. at 728 (citations omitted) (alterations included) (citing Hartford Un-
derwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2000)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 9 U.S.C. § 7 (“The arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any person to 
attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with 
him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed mate-
rial as evidence in the case.”). 
 118 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (“The district court of the district in which a person 
resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to pro-
duce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or interna-
tional tribunal . . . . The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, 
or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of 
any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or 
the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the 
court.”). 
 119 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728. 
 120 Id. at 729. 
 121 Id.; Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263 
(2004). 
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determine whether analogous proceedings exist [domestically].”122 
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit explained that if there is a concern 
for equality between parties in foreign or international arbitration 
proceedings, the district court has discretion to deny a § 1782 ap-
plication or condition acquiescence on a reciprocal exchange of 
information.123 
Another policy consideration raised by FedEx Corp. was the 
concern that qualifying private arbitration for § 1782 assistance 
could have the effect of encumbering the arbitration process, which 
is valued for its cost and time efficiencies.124 The Sixth Circuit was 
not persuaded by this point because Intel grants district judges the 
discretion to deny a request if it is “unduly intrusive or burden-
some.”125 
Lastly, FedEx Corp. argued that extending § 1782 discovery to 
private arbitration would be incongruous to the “twin aims” of 
§ 1782, which are to “provid[e] efficient assistance to participants 
in international litigation and encourag[e] foreign countries by ex-
ample to provide similar assistance to our courts.”126 FedEx Corp. 
argued that such a decision would “actually disserve[] United 
States interests because it ‘encourage[s] foreign countries to un-
dermine U.S. policy in favor of enforcing private arbitration 
agreements by granting discovery inconsistent with those agree-
ments.’”127 The Sixth Circuit countered this assertion by again re-
minding FedEx Corp. that the district court has discretion to refuse 
any § 1782 request and may do so if it perceives the discovery re-
quest to be contrary to the agreement of the parties.128 
Overall, the Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the meaning of 
the word “tribunal” in concluding that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration 
qualifies as a § 1782 “foreign or international tribunal”—neither 
legislative nor policy arguments dissuaded the court from reaching 
this conclusion. The court reversed the district court’s decision and 
 
 122 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 729 (quoting Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 263). 
 123 See id. 
 124 Id. at 729–30. 
 125 See id. at 730 (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265). 
 126 Id. (citing FedEx Brief, supra note 69, at 20). 
 127 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting FedEx Brief, supra note 69, at 
20). 
 128 Id. 
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remanded it for further consideration, instructing the lower court to 
apply the Intel factors to determine whether the § 1782 request 
should be granted.129 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT MUST ADDRESS THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
CREATED BY FEDEX 
The Sixth Circuit created a split among Courts of Appeals that 
will not easily be neglected by the Supreme Court130—especially 
given the significance of private arbitration in modern cross-border 
transactions.131 Unsurprisingly, a number of courts have already 
been confronted with the question of how to define “tribunal” in 
the context of § 1782 discovery since the FedEx decision in 
2019.132 But, these subsequent decisions have not brought greater 
clarity to the issue: Inevitably, the Supreme Court will need to clar-
ify the statutory meaning of “tribunal.” This Note posits that the 
Supreme Court would likely support the FedEx court’s compre-
hensive analysis on the issue and would approve of its interpreta-
tion of § 1782. 
A.  The Application of § 1782 to Arbitral Tribunals Continues 
to be Disputed 
With the ever-growing prevalence of international commerce, 
arbitration has become the preferred dispute resolution process in 
cross-border commercial transactions.133 As a result, several courts 
 
 129 Id. at 732. 
 130 See Pinney, supra note 14, at 125. 
 131 See Matthew J. Soroky, Compelling U.S. Discovery in International 
Franchise Arbitrations: The (F)utility of Section 1782 Applications, 39 
FRANCHISE L.J. 185, 185 (2019); Laura Emmy Malament, Note, Making or 
Breaking Your Billion Dollar Case: U.S. Judicial Assistance to Private Interna-
tional Arbitration Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), 67 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1214 
(2014). 
 132 See Servotronics, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 954 F.3d 209, 210 (4th Cir. 2020); 
Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 2020); In re 
Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020); In re Storag Etzel GmbH, No. 19-mc-
209-CFC, 2020 WL 1849714, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2020); In re EWE 
Gasspeicher GmbH, No. 19-mc-109-RGA, 2020 WL 1272612, at *1 (D. Del. 
Mar. 17, 2020); HRC-Hainan Holding Co. v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-mc-80277-TSH, 
2020 WL 906719, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2020). 
 133 See Soroky, supra note 131, at 185; Malament, supra note 131, at 1214. 
1262 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1241 
 
have already been asked to weigh in on the recent circuit split.134 
Among Courts of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit has chosen to align 
with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute,135 while the 
Second and Seventh Circuits have reached opposite conclusions.136 
After FedEx, the Fourth Circuit was the next Court of Appeals 
to examine the issue.137 Like the Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit 
found that Congress intended to expand the reach of § 1782 “to 
increase international cooperation by providing U.S. assistance in 
resolving disputes before not only foreign courts but before all for-
eign and international tribunals.”138 Also congruent with the Sixth 
Circuit’s analysis, the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea that allowing 
§ 1782 discovery in arbitral proceedings would “inject extraordi-
nary delay and costs into arbitrations, thereby defeating their pur-
pose and undermining parties’ bargained-for method of dispute 
resolution” because any undue burden “can and should be man-
aged by the district court with the discretion conferred on it by 
[§ 1782].”139 
Interestingly, in addressing the argument that § 1782 was 
meant to apply only to government-controlled tribunals and not 
private commercial arbitrations, the Fourth Circuit pointed to the 
FAA as evidence that arbitration is in fact regulated by the gov-
ernment and would therefore be a product of “government-
conferred authority.”140 It explained that the FAA “provides par-
ticular procedural mechanisms for conducting arbitrations, as well 
as for court supervision and enforcement of arbitral awards[,]” 
which confirms that “arbitration in the United States is a congres-
sionally endorsed and regulated process that is judicially super-
vised.”141 
By contrast, in In re Guo, the Second Circuit upheld it’s ruling 
in National Broadcasting “that the phrase ‘foreign or international 
tribunal’ does not encompass ‘arbitral bod[ies] established by pri-
 
 134 See supra note 132 (listing cases). 
 135 See Boeing, 954 F.3d at 210. 
 136 See In re Guo, 965 F.3d at 100; Rolls-Royce, 975 F.3d at 690. 
 137 See Boeing, 954 F.3d at 210. 
 138 See id. at 213. 
 139 Id. at 214–15. 
 140 Id. at 213–14. 
 141 Id. 
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vate parties.’”142 The Guo court essentially found that Intel did not 
overrule National Broadcasting because Intel never directly ad-
dressed the question of “whether a private international arbitration 
tribunal qualifies as a ‘tribunal’ under § 1782.”143 It regarded Pro-
fessor Smit’s definition of “tribunal” quoted in the Intel opinion as 
mere dicta and overall, found Intel to be both unpersuasive and 
non-binding.144 
Similarly, in Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, the Sev-
enth Circuit chose to align with National Broadcasting and 
Biedermann.145 In reaching this decision the court conducted a 
statutory interpretation of “foreign or international tribunal,” find-
ing that it could only apply to “governmental, administrative, or 
quasi-governmental” entities and not private arbitrations.146 It also 
relied heavily on the fact that if § 1782 were available in private 
international arbitrations, it would make available broader discov-
ery than that which is available to domestic arbitrations, which it 
found to be “a serious conflict with the [FAA].”147 Like the Guo 
court, the Rolls-Royce court found the Supreme Court’s mention of 
Professor Smit’s law review article to be insignificant.148 
As the Courts of Appeals dispute the application of this discov-
ery tool, parties to international arbitration agreements eagerly an-
ticipate clarity.149 A resolution of this matter could affect the way 
 
 142 In re Guo, 965 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (em-
phasis added) (quoting Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 
191 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 143 Id. at 103. 
 144 Id. at 105. 
 145 Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 
2020). 
 146 Id. at 694–95 (“Service-of-process assistance and letters rogatory—
governed by §§ 1696 and 1781—are matters of comity between governments, 
which suggests that the phrase ‘foreign or international tribunal’ as used in this 
statutory scheme means state-sponsored tribunals and does not include private 
arbitration panels.”). 
 147 Id. at 695–96. 
 148 Id. at 696 (asserting that this portion of Intel opinion “has taken on out-
sized significance”). 
 149 Two other § 1782 cases recently appealed to the Third and Ninth Circuits. 
In re EWE Gasspeicher GmbH, No. 19-mc-109-RGA, 2020 WL 1272612 (D. 
Del. Mar. 17), appeal filed, No. 20-1830 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2020); HRC-Hainan 
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arbitration agreements are drafted and will certainly influence how 
parties approach pending disputes. The Supreme Court will need to 
make a determination regarding the circuit split created by FedEx 
in the near future.150 
B. The Supreme Court Would Likely Approve of the Analysis 
in FedEx 
In the event that FedEx or a similar case is granted certiorari, it 
is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court would uphold the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision because the opinion presents a sound and 
comprehensive statutory construction. 
1. THE FEDEX EMPLOYED A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
CONGRUENT WITH THE METHODS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court commonly begins statutory interpretation 
with the words of the statute at issue,151 and the FedEx court did 
just that: It conducted a thorough textual analysis of “foreign or 
international tribunal.”152 Because the definition of the term “for-
eign or international tribunal” was absent from the statute, the 
FedEx court examined the plain meaning of the language of the 
text,153 a practice that is consistently followed by the Supreme 
Court.154 To determine the ordinary meaning of the word, the Sixth 
Circuit employed the common Supreme Court practice of consult-
 
Holding Co. v. Yihan Hu, No. 19-mc-80277-TSH, 2020 WL 906719 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 25), appeal filed, No. 20-15371 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020). 
 150 See Samberg & Rosenbaum, supra note 12. 
 151 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16 (2012) (“One naturally must begin with 
the words of the statute when the very subject of the litigation is what the statute 
requires.”). 
 152 See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 717–
23 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 153 See id. at 717. 
 154 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a 
word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordi-
nary or natural meaning.”); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) 
(“‘In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language,’ giving the 
‘words used’ their ‘ordinary meaning.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting United 
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); and then quoting Richards v. Unit-
ed States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))). 
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ing dictionaries.155 They found that contemporary dictionaries sup-
ported an interpretation of “tribunal” that is “broad enough to in-
clude private arbitration.”156 The Sixth Circuit further analyzed the 
congressional meaning and legal use—including the Supreme 
Court’s own use—of “tribunal” to support a broad interpretation of 
the word.157 
In fact, the Sixth Circuit specifically addressed the Supreme 
Court’s use of the word “tribunal” in Intel to support its statutory 
interpretation.158 It pointed out the Court’s own conclusion that 
“the word ‘tribunal’ applies to non-judicial proceedings[,]” and 
noted the Court’s tacit approval of Professor Smit’s definition of 
“tribunal,” which explicitly included “arbitral tribunals.”159 
By contrast, the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit courts con-
ducted only a cursory analysis of the plain meaning of “tribunal,” 
finding the term to be broad enough to encompass private arbitra-
tion, but concluding that it was simply ambiguous.160 The Sixth 
Circuit rightly noted that “the Second and Fifth Circuits turned to 
legislative history too early in the interpretation process.”161 By 
neglecting to examine the congressional meaning and legal uses of 
the word, these courts simply glossed over an essential step in stat-
utory construction.162 Given the exhaustive textual examination 
conducted by the Sixth Circuit, which included the ordinary defini-
tion, congressional meaning, and judicial uses of the word “tribu-
 
 155 See, e.g., Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 
2362–63 (2019) (using dictionaries from time that Congress enacted Freedom of 
Information Act to determine the meaning of the word “confidential”). 
 156 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 719–20. 
 157 See id. at 718, 720–23 (“Words ‘must be read in their context and with a 
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” (quoting Davis v. Mich. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). 
 158 Id. at 723. 
 159 Id. at 724. 
 160 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 
1999); Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689, 693–94 (7th Cir. 
2020). 
 161 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 726. 
 162 The Seventh Circuit conducted a brief analysis of both the dictionary 
definitions and congressional meaning of the term but failed to consider the 
common legal uses. See Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d at 693–95. 
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nal,” the Supreme Court would likely agree with the conclusion 
reached by the Sixth Circuit. 
2. THE FEDEX COURT ALIGNED ITS ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY WITH INTEL 
Although the FedEx court relied almost exclusively on a strict 
textual analysis of § 1782 to reach its conclusion, it did go on to 
support its finding by addressing the legislative history of the stat-
ute.163 The Sixth Circuit made similar findings about the legislative 
history of § 1782 as those presented by the Supreme Court in Intel. 
It also used the analyses conducted by the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits to support its own contrary conclusion.164 
In Intel, the Supreme Court described the evolution of § 1782 
where “any judicial proceeding” was replaced with “a proceeding 
in a foreign or international tribunal.”165 This was significant be-
cause it extended the availability of the § 1782 discovery tool to a 
variety of proceedings.166 The Court placed great emphasis on the 
congressional intent to apply the statute broadly and emphasized 
the lack of limits placed on the scope of the statute by Congress.167 
The Supreme Court then underscored its legislative analysis with 
Professor Smit’s quote defining “tribunal.”168 As a leading drafter 
of the 1964 revisions to the statute, Professor Smit was cited re-
peatedly throughout Intel as persuasive authority on the meaning 
and application of § 1782.169 Thus, the Supreme Court would like-
 
 163 Fedex, 939 F.3d at 727–28. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 257–58 
(2004). 
 166 See id. at 249. 
 167 See, e.g., id. at 263 n.15 (“Congress left unbounded by categorical rules 
the determination whether a matter is proceeding ‘in a foreign or international 
tribunal.’”). 
 168 Id. at 258. 
 169 See id. at 247 n.1, 248, 249 n.8, 256–59, 261 n.12, 262 n.13, 265 n.17. 
Indeed, Professor Smit has written much about the intended definition of tribu-
nal, and his construction of the word clearly includes arbitral tribunals: For ex-
ample, in another article, he wrote “the term ‘tribunal’ in Section 1782 includes 
an arbitral tribunal created by private agreement.” Hans Smit, American Assis-
tance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 
28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 6 (1998) [herein-
after American Assistance]. 
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ly continue to follow Professor Smit’s broad definition of the term 
“tribunal” within § 1782. 
Like the Supreme Court in Intel, the FedEx court found the leg-
islative history to command liberal interpretation of the statute.170 
In fact, the Sixth Circuit used the exact legislative sources cited in 
National Broadcasting to reach an opposite conclusion.171 In Na-
tional Broadcasting, the Second Circuit conceded that legislative 
history indicates an intent to expand the statute but leaped to an 
assumption that because private arbitration was not specifically 
mentioned, it was not within the consideration of Congress at the 
time the statute was drafted.172 This reasoning advanced by the 
Second Circuit lacked concrete support. 
The Sixth Circuit correctly pointed out that there is no evidence 
that Congress intended to exclude private arbitration from the stat-
ute’s expansion.173 By contrast, “[t]he facts on which the legisla-
tive history is most clear are the substitution of ‘tribunal’ for ‘judi-
cial proceeding’ broadened the scope of the statute,” indicating 
“Congress’s intent to expand § 1782(a)’s applicability.”174 Like the 
Supreme Court in Intel, the FedEx court found that the legislative 
history points to a purposeful expansion of the statute without any 
indication of limitations. 
The reasoning in Intel indicates that the Supreme Court would 
approach statutory construction of § 1782 using textual analysis 
and legislative history, much like the Sixth Circuit did in FedEx. 
Given the Intel court’s use of the word tribunal, its explanation of 
the broadening of the statute in the 1960s, and its approval of Pro-
fessor Smit’s definition of the word “tribunal,” the Supreme Court 
would likely agree with the conclusion reached in FedEx. 
 
 170 See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 728 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
 171 Id. at 727–28. 
 172 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“The absence of any reference to private dispute resolution proceedings such as 
arbitration strongly suggests that Congress did not consider them in drafting the 
statute.”). 
 173 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728. 
 174 Id. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION IN LIGHT OF FEDEX 
Although the FedEx opinion provided a thorough and compre-
hensive analysis of the issues surrounding the application of 
§ 1782 to private arbitration, the decision left many questions un-
answered. Primary among them is whether the statute will imper-
missibly burden the arbitration process and create asymmetry 
among parties.175 Although the FedEx court addressed this argu-
ment in its opinion, the effect of its decision remains to be seen in 
real-world application. Additionally, if international arbitral tribu-
nals qualify for aid under § 1782, it is possible that the discovery 
tool would be utilized by arbitral tribunals considered to be “inter-
national” but are, in fact, located domestically.176 
A. Remaining Public Policy Considerations 
The most common concern about extending § 1782 to private 
arbitral proceedings is that it will impermissibly burden the arbitra-
tion process.177 Private arbitration has overwhelmingly become the 
leading choice of dispute resolution in international commercial 
contracts and plays an essential role in the increasingly globalized 
economy.178 Parties to cross-border transactions value arbitration 
as a process that is cost-effective and efficient.179 There is a wide-
spread fear that these benefits will vanish if § 1782 is made availa-
ble in private arbitration because it will encumber the alternative 
 
 175 See, e.g., Malament, supra note 131, at 1231–32 (discussing concerns 
expressed by Second Circuit in National Broadcasting). 
 176 See, e.g., COMM. ON INT’L COM. DISPS., N.Y.C. BAR, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 AS 
A MEANS OF OBTAINING DISCOVERY IN AID OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION—APPLICABILITY AND BEST PRACTICES 32–35 (2008) [hereinafter 
NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE], https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-
career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports////57461369f8f0a1240059dd
9f/01-01-2008/12-31-2008/1/10 (discussing whether § 1782 should apply to 
“foreign or international tribunals” seated in the United States). 
 177 See Malament, supra note 131, at 1231–32; Kenneth Beale et al., Solving 
the § 1782 Puzzle: Bringing Certainty to the Debate Over 28 U.S.C. § 1782’s 
Application to International Arbitration, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 91–92 (2011); 
Conley, supra note 28, at 67–68. 
 178 See Malament, supra note 131, at 1214; Soroky, supra note 131, at 185. 
 179 Malament, supra note 131, at 1231. 
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dispute resolution mechanism with broad U.S.-style discovery and 
greater judicial involvement.180 
The concern that § 1782 discovery would be cumbersome and 
inequitable was expressed by both the Second and Fifth Circuits.181 
The Sixth Circuit, however, found these concerns to be overblown 
because “§ 1782(a) is permissive: the district court ‘may’ order 
discovery, and the Supreme Court has made clear that the district 
court has wide discretion in determining whether and how to do 
so.”182 Not only did Intel create a list of four factors for judges to 
consider before granting a § 1782 request, but it also empowered 
judges to reject any request deemed unreasonable or inconsistent 
with the goals of the parties.183 In other words, a request must 
withstand the scrutiny of a court—it is by no means automatically 
granted.184 
Additionally, in addressing inequitable access to discovery, the 
Supreme Court rejected the idea that an applicant must provide 
equivalent discovery.185 It noted that if fairness was a concern, “a 
district court could condition relief upon that person’s reciprocal 
exchange of information.”186 The arbitrators also have the power to 
exclude any evidence they deem to be improper and “can place 
conditions on its acceptance of the information to maintain what-
ever measure of parity it concludes is appropriate.”187 
Arbitration is a mechanism that is contracted for by the par-
ties.188 Some have expressed concern that allowing § 1782 discov-
ery in private arbitrations would be contrary to the provisions 
 
 180 Beale et al., supra note 177, at 91–92. 
 181 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190–91 (2d Cir. 
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
 182 In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 730 
(6th Cir. 2019) (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 
241, 261–62, 265–66 (2004)). 
 183 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264–66. 
 184 See id. at 266 (“Having held that § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not re-
quire, discovery assistance, we leave it to the courts below to ensure an airing 
adequate to determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate.”). 
 185 Id. at 262–63. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See Conley, supra note 28, at 67–69. 
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agreed upon by the parties, which often prescribe very limited dis-
covery.189 The second Intel factor, however, asks district courts to 
consider “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the 
proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign 
government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court 
judicial assistance.”190 Accordingly, the rules and proceedings of a 
party-selected arbitral tribunal, the receptivity of that tribunal to 
discovery assistance, and the intentions of the contracting parties 
would weigh in a court’s decision to grant the § 1782 request.191 
There is ample opportunity for parties, judges, and arbitrators to 
ensure the discovery process is reasonable, fair, and harmonious 
with the goals of the arbitration. 
Further, the Biedermann and National Broadcasting courts 
voiced concern that § 1782 discovery conflicts with the FAA be-
cause it grants broader discovery than is permitted in domestic ar-
bitration.192 The FedEx court dispels this concern by pointing out 
that nothing requires domestic arbitration and international arbitra-
tion to provide equivalent discovery.193 Professor Smit has com-
mented that 
[t]he fact that [§] 1782 . . . does not deal with the 
domestic arena cannot be seriously considered as an 
argument for limiting its intended purpose in the in-
ternational arena. On the contrary, if anything, it 
should move the legislature dealing with domestic 
adjudication to emulate the reform achieved on the 
international level. . . . In fact, the aim of the draft-
ers of [§] 1782 was that domestic legislatures adopt 
 
 189 Id. at 68–69. 
 190 Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 264. 
 191 See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 730 
(6th Cir. 2019); Malament, supra note 131, at 1241 (proposing a four-step 
framework for district courts when deciding whether to grant a § 1782 request). 
 192 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 
1999); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 882–83 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
 193 FedEx, 939 F.3d at 728–29 (citing Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 260–61). 
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the liberalized rules they provided for the interna-
tional situation.194 
Thus, in light of Intel and FedEx, the public policy arguments 
present unpersuasive points. These cases prove that § 1782 is only 
available in limited circumstances, alleviating the concern that 
such judicial assistance in private arbitration would over-burden 
arbitration proceedings, unfairly benefit foreign parties, or infringe 
upon the intentions of the contracting parties. 
B. The Applicability of § 1782 to International Arbitral 
Proceedings Seated Domestically 
Should the Supreme Court agree to extend § 1782 assistance to 
private arbitration proceedings, another issue is whether an arbitral 
tribunal that is seated in the United States and considered to be 
“international” falls within the § 1782 definition of “foreign or in-
ternational tribunals.” International arbitral tribunals located within 
the United States could reasonably be included within the § 1782 
definition of “foreign or international tribunal.” 
1. “FOREIGN TRIBUNAL” AND “INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL” 
HAVE DIFFERENT MEANINGS 
The text of § 1782 implies a distinction between what is con-
sidered to be a “foreign tribunal” versus an “international tribu-
nal.”195 Indeed, the statute reads, “[t]he district court of the dis-
trict in which a person resides or is found may order him to give 
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing 
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.”196 
This indicates that these terms are distinct. 
The FedEx court found no evidence that the terms “foreign tri-
bunal” and “international tribunal” are terms of art.197 “Foreign” 
and “international” have, however, been used and defined in dis-
 
 194 Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of 
Section 1782: Its Potential Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 311 (2003). 
 195 See 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 
 196 Id. (emphasis added). 
 197 See FedEx, 939 F.3d at 718–19. 
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tinctly different ways within the context of arbitration.198 For ex-
ample, “foreign arbitration” has been used in a much narrower ca-
pacity to describe arbitration proceedings taking place in another 
country.199 Accordingly, it seems that the definition of “foreign 
arbitration” primarily focuses on the geographical location of the 
tribunal.200 By contrast, “international arbitration” has a broad 
meaning that does not depend on the location of the proceed-
ings.201 
2. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ENCOMPASSES NON-
DOMESTIC ARBITRATION AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION 
Chapter 2 of the FAA enforces the New York Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the 
Convention”), which was created to “encourage the recognition 
and enforcement of international arbitral awards.”202 Accordingly, 
the term “international arbitral awards” includes both “awards 
made in a [state] other than that in which enforcement of the award 
is sought” as well as those awards “not considered as domestic” in 
the state of enforcement.203 Those awards have been referred to as 
 
 198 See, e.g., Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 629–
30 (1989) [hereinafter A-National Arbitration]. 
 199 See, e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 
1983). Article I of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards states: “This Convention shall apply to 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a 
State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards 
are sought . . . .” United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 
38 [hereinafter The New York Convention]. The Second Circuit refers to this as 
the “territorial criterion,” explaining that a foreign arbitral award—one rendered 
in another country—meets the “territorial criterion.” Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931–
32. 
 200 See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931–32; Stahr, supra note 15, at 619. 
 201 See Stahr, supra note 15, at 619; A-National Arbitration, supra note 198, 
at 629–30. 
 202 Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141 F.3d 
1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932); 9 U.S.C. 
§ 201. 
 203 See Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1440; Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931; see also 
Paolo Contini, International Commercial Arbitration: The United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 283, 293–94 (1959) (“Article I [of the Convention] seems to permit 
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“foreign awards” and “non-domestic awards,” respectively.204 
Thus, it follows that because Chapter 2 governs “international arbi-
tral awards,” then “foreign awards” and “non-domestic awards” 
both fall within the purview of “international arbitral awards.” 
Unfortunately, the Convention does not define a “non-
domestic” award.205 Courts, however, have relied on § 202 of the 
FAA in interpreting the term.206 The section provides as follows:  
An agreement or award arising out of such a rela-
tionship which is entirely between citizens of the 
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the 
Convention unless that relationship involves proper-
ty located abroad, envisages performance or en-
forcement abroad, or has some other reasonable re-
lation with one or more foreign states.207 
In other words, an award is “non-domestic” if the arbitration 
involves property located abroad or the dispute is not “entirely be-
tween citizens of the United States.”208 Courts have found that an 
 
only one construction . . . . [T]he Convention applies to all arbitral awards ren-
dered in a country other than the state of enforcement, whether or not any of 
such awards may be regarded as domestic in that state; it also applies to all 
awards not considered as domestic in the state of enforcement, whether or not 
any of such awards may have been rendered in the territory of that state.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932. The court explains that awards “not 
considered as domestic” or “nondomestic awards” are “made within the legal 
framework of another country . . . or involving parties domiciled or having their 
principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction. Id. It also points 
out that for an award to be considered a “foreign award” it must meet the “terri-
torial criterion” of being made outside the jurisdiction where enforcement is 
sought. Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 See, e.g., Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1440–41. 
 207 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
 208 See Indus. Risk, 141 F.3d at 1441 (“We read [Section 202 of the Conven-
tion] to define all arbitral awards not ‘entirely between citizens of the United 
States’ as ‘non-domestic’ for purposes of Article I of the Convention. We join 
the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in holding that arbitration agree-
ments and awards ‘not considered as domestic’ in the United States are those 
agreements and awards ‘which are subject to the Convention . . . because [they 
were’ . . . involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business 
outside the enforcing jurisdiction.’” (alterations in original) (emphasis removed) 
(quoting Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932)). 
1274 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1241 
 
arbitral agreement or award between parties, whereby one of the 
parties is domiciled or has a principle place of business outside of 
the United States, is considered to be “non-domestic”—even if the 
seat of arbitration is located in the United States.209 Thus, accord-
ing to U.S. precedent, an award is “non-domestic” if the dispute 
involves an international element. 
Based on the above interpretation of the Convention, interna-
tional arbitration proceedings are both “foreign arbitrations” 
(which relates to the location of the tribunal) and “non-domestic 
arbitrations” (which relates to the nationalities of the parties, the 
place where the contract is intended to be executed, and the loca-
tion of any property at issue). Thus, because an international arbi-
tration proceeding can take place within U.S. borders, an arbitra-
tion seated in the United States may be considered an “internation-
al tribunal” if the parties have different nationalities or the nature 
of the contract is international. 
Moreover, at the time § 1782 was constructed, the word “inter-
national arbitration” was used in reference to private commercial 
arbitration between parties of different nationalities.210 For exam-
ple, in 1923, forty years before the current form of § 1782 was in-
troduced, the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”), the 
leading private commercial arbitral institute, established the Court 
of International Arbitration for commercial disputes between par-
ties from different countries.211 This indicates that the ICC defined 
“international arbitration” based on the nationality of the parties 
rather than the seat of arbitration and that the term “international 
arbitration” encompassed private disputes at the time the statute 
was drafted. 
3.  INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION COVERS A WIDE SPECTRUM 
OF ARBITRAL DISPUTES 
“International arbitration” is a term that has been used to de-
scribe a wide range of arbitral disputes; it cannot be narrowly con-
strued to apply, for example, exclusively to governmental entities. 
Indeed, Professor Smit defined international arbitration broadly: 
 
 209 Id. 
 210 See JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 19 (2003). 
 211 Id. 
2021] THE POWER OF TWO WORDS TO SPLIT CIRCUITS 1275 
 
“International arbitration deals with matters that have elements 
connecting them to more than one state . . . .”212 
U.S. courts have used the term “international arbitral proceed-
ings” to describe a variety of private disputes. For example, it has 
been used to describe treaty-based arbitrations, such as ICSID pro-
ceedings pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty or the U.S.-
Iranian Claims Tribunal.213 The term has also been used to refer to 
foreign private commercial arbitrations seated in another coun-
try,214 and it has been used to characterize “non-domestic” arbitra-
tions located within the United States between citizens of different 
countries.215 
Indeed, Professor Smit has noted that an arbitration proceeding 
within the United States with parties of different nationalities may 
be a “prime example of a truely [sic] international arbitration.”216 
In explaining how § 1782 was intended to be construed, Professor 
Smit confirms that “the broad term ‘international tribunal’ was 
intended to cover all international arbitral tribunals.”217 He ex-
plained that “the term ‘international’ should be given the broadest 
possible construction. Accordingly, a tribunal is international in the 
sense of [§ 1782] when any of the parties before it, or any of the 
arbitrators, is not a citizen or resident of the United States.”218 
Thus, if the term “international tribunal” was meant to be defined 
broadly and to include all international tribunals, then arbitrations 
pursuant to a treaty, “foreign arbitrations,” and “non-domestic arbi-
trations” that are seated within the United States, are all within the 
definition “international tribunal” under § 1782. 
 
 212 A-National Arbitration, supra note 198, at 629–30. 
 213 See, e.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 566 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 
(1st Cir. 1983); In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 214 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 636 (1985); Bahrain Telecomms. Co. v. Discoverytel, Inc., 476 F. 
Supp. 2d 176, 177–78 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 215 See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141 
F.3d 1434, 1440–41 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 216 A-National Arbitration, supra note 198, at 630. 
 217 American Assistance, supra note 169, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 218 Id. at 6–8. 
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4.  AN “INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL” NEED NOT BE SEATED 
ABROAD UNDER § 1782 
Another point of contention is whether § 1782 is intended sole-
ly for proceedings abroad, thereby barring application of the statute 
to international tribunals located within the United States. This 
argument may be supported by Intel, which does not directly ad-
dress the issue but does place some emphasis on the tribunals lo-
cated abroad. For example, Intel states, “a court presented with a 
§ 1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign 
tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and 
the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency 
abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.”219 Additionally, 
the Intel court states, “Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to 
tribunals abroad.”220 There is, however, no statutory language lim-
iting the term “foreign or international tribunal” to proceedings 
abroad and, as the FedEx court noted, there is nothing to indicate 
that these quoted sections intended to define “tribunal.”221 
Additionally, the Committee on International Commercial Dis-
putes (“the Committee”) addressed this issue in a report that de-
scribes best practices for the use of § 1782 in international arbitra-
tion.222 The report explained that there is persuasive reasoning on 
both sides: There are good arguments that § 1782 applies exclu-
sively to tribunals located in another country, but there are also 
convincing interpretations allowing for an “international tribunal” 
to be seated in the United States.223 To settle the conflict, the 
Committee proposes a “bright line rule” excluding any arbitral 
proceedings seated within the United States from § 1782 discov-
ery.224 
This rule places arbitrary restrictions on § 1782, which was 
meant to be construed broadly.225 Consider an example of a com-
 
 219 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
 220 Id. at 263. 
 221 See In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings 
(Abdul Latif Jameel Transp. Co. v. FedEx Corp.) (FedEx), 939 F.3d 710, 725 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
 222 NEW YORK CITY BAR COMMITTEE, supra note 176, at 33–35. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 35. 
 225 See American Assistance, supra note 169, at 5. 
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mercial arbitration located in Switzerland under German law be-
tween Australian and American parties according to ICDR Arbitra-
tion rules. In this example, the chosen arbitrators are citizens of 
Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. Under the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s ruling, this arbitration qualifies as a “foreign or international 
tribunal” for § 1782 purposes. The arbitrators and “any interested 
party” are free to apply to a district court of the United States for 
assistance under § 1782. Now, if everything remains the same, but 
the seat of arbitration is moved from Switzerland to Miami, under 
the bright line rule proposed by the Committee, the parties in this 
arbitration would be stripped of the privilege of judicial assistance. 
The only difference in these proceedings is the seat of arbitration. 
Nevertheless, both tribunals are international in nature and may 
encounter the same difficulties in obtaining discovery. 
There is little difference between the decision to supply aid to 
private international arbitral proceedings seated abroad versus 
those located domestically. The fact that the seat of arbitration is 
located within U.S. borders may have minimal bearing on the out-
come of the arbitration.226 The parties are empowered to contract 
for any location, nationality of arbitrator, arbitration rules, and 
even applicable law.227 Thus, it may ultimately matter very little 
where the arbitration actually occurs.228 In the end, it may lead to 
forum shopping where parties choose the seat of arbitration outside 
of the United States simply so that they can have access to a more 
advantageous discovery tool. 
 
 226 See generally GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM 
SELECTION AGREEMENTS 115–23 (1999) [hereinafter ARBITRATION AND FORUM 
SELECTION] (explaining that one attraction of international arbitration is that 
parties are free to choose what laws apply to their contract, where their disputes 
will be resolved, and their arbitrators); JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF 
ARBITRATION 29 (2013) (“The law applicable to arbitration is not the law appli-
cable in arbitration. . . . [A] plurality of legal orders may serve as foundations of 
the same arbitral process.”). 
 227 See ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION, supra note 226, at 115–23. 
 228 See generally PAULSSON, supra note 226, at 29–39 (explaining that mod-
ern arbitration is “subject to a multiplicity of systems” and the award may be 
enforced in in a variety of jurisdictions whether or not an award’s country of 
origin has accepted the award). 
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5. § 1782 COULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES 
An examination of the history of § 1782 demonstrates that it is 
continuously being interpreted more liberally. According to judi-
cial interpretations of the Convention, a tribunal seated within the 
United States constitutes an international arbitral tribunal if the 
nature of the dispute is international.229 Thus, it is possible that 
§ 1782 could be extended to include international arbitral proceed-
ings within the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
The FedEx court accomplished what Thomas Jefferson advised 
his nephew to do—in its comprehensive opinion, it called upon 
every fact and every opinion to structure its reasoning. Given its 
broad application of § 1782 in Intel, the Supreme Court would be 
likely to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the term “for-
eign or international tribunal” within § 1782 encompasses private 
arbitration. However, even if this facet of the § 1782 debate is fi-
nally settled, more questions regarding the scope of § 1782 in pri-
vate arbitration wait below the surface, not least of which is 
whether it can be extended to international arbitral proceedings 
conducted within the United States. 
This once forgotten and esoteric statute now rises to the fore-
front of the most important international commercial disputes, and 
it will be imperative for the Supreme Court to address these emerg-
ing concerns that have an immense impact on global commercial 
relations. Indeed, the Supreme Court will be required to bring 
clarity to those two words that incited the recent circuit split—
“arbitral tribunals.” 
 
 229 See, e.g., Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte Gmbh, 141 
F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that an arbitration located in Flor-
ida between a German Corporation and a Florida Corporation is “non-domestic” 
under the Convention); Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (concluding that an arbitration located in the United States between 
two foreign parties is “non-domestic” under the Convention). 
